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had been held that the board had no power to waive. But even
in such cases, a constant disregard of the by-laws by the board
of directors with the acquiescence of the stockholders may effect
their repeal. Thus, a habitual failure of the directors to comply
with by-laws providing for notice of assessments was held to
abrogate them.5 Continued disregard of the by-laws by the direc-
tors in assessing stock for a greater sum than provided, or in
making loans for a number of years,7 has been held to result in
waiver.
J.W.L.
CRIMINAL LAW - FALSE PRETENSE AND CONFIDENCE GAME
STATUTE-MEANING OF "PROPERTY"-Defendant, superintendent of
the Louisiana Highway Commission, used highway commission
labor to paint his house and improvements. He was charged with
obtaining "money or property" by means of false pretenses' and
also by means of the confidence game.2 Held, that labor, being
neither money nor property, was not covered by these statutes.
State v. Smith, 197 So. 429 (La. 1940).
Perhaps a result more desirable than the one reached in the
instant case would have been achieved if the court had adopted
a broader construction of the word "property."8 Yet the decision
has ample support in legal precedent.' It may appear rather
5. Graves Valley Irr. Co. v. Fruita Imp. Co., 37 Colo. 483, 86 Pac. 324
(1906).
6. Huxtable v. Berg, 98 Wash. 616, 168 Pac. 187 (1917).
7. Blair v. Metropolitan Savings Bank, 27 Wash. 192, 67 Pac. 609 (1902).
1. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 813 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 945]: "Who-
ever, by any false pretense, shall obtain or aid and assist another in obtain-
ing, from any person, money or any property, with intent to defraud him of
the same, shall on conviction be punished by imprisonment at hard labor or
-otherwise, not exceeding twelve months."
2. La. Act 43 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 946]: "Every person
who shall obtain or attempt to obtain from any other person or persons, any
money or property, by means or by use of any false or bogus checks, or by
any other means, instrument or device, commonly called the confidence
game, shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than three
months nor more than five years."
3. Cf. State v. Thatcher, 35 N.J. Law 445, 454 (1872), where the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court, In giving the term "valuable thing" the broadest possible
Interpretation, declared that, "Under our humane system of criminal law,
judicial ingenuity should not exhaust its resources to reach an interpretation
In favor of wrong." Few courts have followed this reasoning.
4. Gleason v. Thaw, 185 Fed. 345, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 894 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1911),
affirmed 236 U.S. 558, 35 S.Ct. 287, 59 L.Ed. 717 (1915) (services are not in-
cluded within the word "property" as construed In connection with false pre-
strange that the word "property" has been so narrowly defined in
connection with our criminal statutes, while at the same time it
is accorded a very broad interpretation when considered in con-
nection with the "due process" clause of the Constitution.5 A par-
tial explanation lies in the fact that the early American criminal
statutes were modeled after and interpreted in the light of the
contemporary laws of England which at that time protected only
money and chattels.6 It was the express legislative intent to fol-
low the English common law when the original Louisiana false
pretense statute was enacted in 1805.7 The present statute is
almost identical.' Although the confidence game statute was
passed at a later date when the nature and value of intangibles
and property rights therein were fully recognized, the similarity
of its phraseology to that of the false pretense statute is prob-
ably responsible for the same narrow interpretation.9
In view of the fact that the court has decided with apparent
finality upon a limiting interpretation of our false pretense and
confidence game statutes, it may be well to consider what changes
in phraseology would be necessary in order to make these statutes
all-inclusive. In many states the lawmakers added the words "or
any valuable thing." The Mississippi Supreme Court held that a
statute so worded embraces services obtained by false pretense. 0
However, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that even this ap-
parently all-inclusive wording does not cover the obtaining of a
loan extension by fraudulent means.1 The court declared that
tense statutes); approved in Carville v. Lane, 117 Me. 95, 101 At. 968 (1917)
(loan renewal is not property). Ex parte Wheeler, 7 Okla. Cr. App. 562, 124
Pac. 764 (1912) (medical services are not property).
5. In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 Fed. 481 (C.C. Cal. 1880) (court held labor
to be property).
6. 30 George II, c. 24, § 1 (1757) included money, goods, wares, and mer-
chandise. 52 George III, c. 64, § 1 (1812) added choses In action.
7. Act of July 3, 1805, of Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans
was supplementary to the Crimes Act of May 4, 1805, § 33, providing: "That
all crimes, offenses and misdemeanors herein before named, shall be taken,
Intended and construed according to and in conformity with the common
law of England .. " The same provision, except for the words "herein
before named," is to be found in La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 976. See State v.
Lacombe, 12 La. Ann. 195, 196 (1857) (common law used to interpret the
meaning of larceny statute); State v. Mullen, 14 La. Ann. 570 (1859) (common
law used to define crime of murder); State v. Vicknair, 52 La. Ann. 1921, 28
So. 273 (1900) (common law used to define crime against nature).
8. Compare La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 813 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 9451
with Act of July 3, 1805, of the Second Session of the Legislative Council of
the Territory of Orleans, c. iv, § 2.
9. Compare La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 813 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 945]
with La. Act 43 of 1912, § 1 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) § 946].
10. State v. Ball, 114 Miss. 505, 75 So. 373 (1917).
11. State v. Tower, 122 Kan. 165, 251 Pac. 401, 52 A.L.R. 1160 (1926).
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such an extension is a mere "pecuniary advantage" and is not
included within the wording "or other valuable thing whatso-
ever." It follows that if all doubt is to be eliminated, the statutes
should include "any tangible or intangible thing of value whether
the same be money, property, rights in action, labor, services, or
any other pecuniary advantage."
R.B.L.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-OPENING STATEMENT-ADMISSIBILITY OP
EVIDENCE NOT MENTIONED IN OPENING STATEMENT-Certain por-
tions of the district attorney's opening statement in a criminal
trial were objected to by defendant as untrue and hence preju-
dicial to the defendant on the ground that the opening statement
is regarded as evidence. Held, it is the mandatory duty of the
district attorney in all cases triable by jury to make an opening
statement explaining the nature of the charge against the accused
and the evidence by which he expects to establish the same. The
statement has no binding force and is designed only "to enable
the jury to understand and appreciate the testimony as it falls
from the lips of the witnesses."1 State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709,
194 So. 756 (1940).
The spare remarks in the Louisiana criminal jurisprudence
throw very little light on the functions and operation of the open-
ing statement. The present case is employed in this note only as
a point of departure for a very brief discussion of a few current
problems raised by the opening statement in Louisiana criminal
trials. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in
1928, there seems to have been no requirement of an opening
statement, nor can any cases dealing with such a problem be
found. Article 333 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
states that in criminal cases tried before a jury, "the trial shall
proceed in the following order ... ." Among the steps listed is the
opening statement by the district attorney "explaining the nature
of the charge and the evidence by which he expects to establish
the same."'2 Many states have held similar statutes merely direc-
tory when the question of omission of the statement has arisen,8
1. Quoted in State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 716, 194 So. 756, 758 (1940) from
People v. Van Zile, 73 Hun 534, 539, 26 N.Y. Supp. 390, 393 (1893).
2. Art. 333, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
3. People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 Pac. 671 (1906); Hendrickson v. Com-
monwealth, 23 Ky. 1191, 64 S.W. 954 (1901); People v. Koharski, 177 Mich.
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